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APPELLANT BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, Honorable Darwin 
C. Hansen, denying Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress following an evidentiary hearing 
which was held on August 11, 1999. After denial of Defendant's motion, Defendant/Appellant 
entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of Theft, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to State v. 
Sery. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), specifically reserving his right to appeal the District Court's 
denial of the Motion to Suppress. The Defendant/Appellant was sentenced on January 26, 2000, 
however, the District Court granted Appellant's Motion to Stay Sentencing Pending Appeal, issuing 
a Certificate of Probable Cause on March 22,2000. 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, finding 
that Deputy Jensen did not exceed the circumstances justifying the initial stop by further detaining 
defendant without articulating a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity? 
Standard of Review The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts. State v.O'BrieiL 959 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah App. 
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1998)(quoting State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah Ct. App.)( citing State v. Pena. 869 p.2d 
932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U. S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
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alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART, I Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.CA. § 77-7-15: Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect— Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
On February 5, 1999, Deputy Gary Jensen of the Davis County Sheriffs Department was 
on routine patrol in the Layton area. (R. 81, pp. 4-5, 30). At approximately 12:00 midnight, 
Deputy Jensen first made contact with Appellant's car. Deputy Jensen noticed the vehicle was 
very erratic with respect to being able to maintain a travel direction in it's respective travel lane, in 
a weaving-type pattern traveling eastbound. (R. 81, pp. 7-9). Deputy Jensen followed Appellant 
for less than a mile. More specifically, about a half a mile, at approximately 35-40 miles per hour, 
lasting maybe a minute or two in duration. (R. 81, pp. 10-11, 31). 
Deputy Jensen was concerned with the driving pattern observed, and, due to the time of 
evening, with more situations in the evening hours resulting in people drinking and driving, 
believed the driver may be impaired. (R. 81, p. 12). Deputy Jensen is a 12 year veteran, has a 
Bachelor's Degree in Criminal Justice and an Associate's Degree in Emergency Care and Rescue. 
(R. 81, p. 4). He has also had countless training hours and is certified in DUI Detection and Field 
Sobriety. (R. 81, pp. 12-13). The deputy then observed the vehicle slow down, briefly drive at a 
slow rate of speed of approximately 5 miles per hour before pulling into a driveway and 
immediately pulling back out and driving onto the curb. However, the deputy later confirmed that 
he had written in his report that Appellant had reversed out of the driveway, pulled up to the curb 
and stopped. (R. 81, pp. 13, 38). 
Appellant brought his vehicle to a stop before Deputy Jensen activated his overhead lights, 
effectuating a stop, exiting his vehicle and making contact with Appellant at his vehicle. (R. 81, p. 
16). Appellant was alone in the vehicle. Deputy Jensen explained his reason for the stop, asked 
for an explanation and Appellant's driver's license, registration and proof of insurance. (R. 81, pp. 
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16-17, 39). Appellant explained that he was stopping at this particular residence to visit a friend 
of his. (R. 81, p. 17). 
During the conversation, the deputy detected an odor of alcohol but was not close enough 
to Appellant to decide whether the alcohol odor was coming from the Appellant or from 
Appellant's vehicle. Deputy Jensen asked Appellant if he had been drinking to which Appellant 
admitted that he had one beer. (R. 81, pp. 18, 39). Appellant explained that he had just come 
from work at Smith's Warehouse, which was located about a quarter of a mile away from the site 
of the stop, and had visited a friend briefly. The deputy confirmed the location of Appellant's 
driving was consistent with having driven from the Smith's workplace. (R. 81, p. 19). 
Deputy Jensen then asked Appellant to exit his vehicle and submit to field sobriety tests. 
As Appellant exited the car, Deputy Jensen determined that the odor of alcohol was coming from 
Appellant's person. The deputy then performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test on 
Appellant and noted zero out of six with respect to the factors one is looking for on that test. 
Deputy Jensen determined that Appellant's statement of having one beer was true and correct and 
was consistent with the test he had performed. Deputy Jensen had no further concerns at this 
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point of Appellant being under the influence. (R. 81, pp. 20-21, 43-44). The deputy testified that 
the time from the initial traffic stop until the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, in which the deputy 
determined there would be no arrest for Driving Under the Influence, was less than a ten-minute 
situation. (R. 81, p. 23). 
Deputy Jensen was then concerned if Appellant had just drank alcohol, then where was the 
alcohol? Because Appellant was not impaired, had admitted to having one beer, the deputy 
thought the alcohol may not be affecting him yet and, Appellant, possibly may have even been 
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consuming the beer prior to the traffic stop. Deputy Jensen was concerned that if Appellant had 
just had the alcohol, gotten off of work, then where was the alcohol consumed and was the 
alcohol still in the vehicle. (R. 81, pp. 23-24). However, the deputy failed to ask any questions 
regarding where Appellant had the beer, when he had it, or if he had been drinking in the car. (R. 
81, pp. 44-46). Before the deputy looked in the car, he was going to release Appellant. 
However, Appellant was not free to leave. (R. 81, p. 27). After concluding that he was not going 
to arrest Appellant Deputy Jensen then requested permission to check for alcohol in the vehicle by 
requesting to search the vehicle and Appellant consented. Deputy Jensen asked immediately after 
performing the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus to look for the alcohol that he assumed to be present 
in the vehicle. Deputy Jensen then proceeded to search Appellant's vehicle. (R. 81, pp. 24-25). 
The deputy characterizes his suspicion of a possible open container as a "statement of possibility" 
with regards to Appellant. (R. 81, p. 48-49). 
Deputy Jensen did not perform a check on Appellant's driver license, registration and 
proof of insurance until well after his search of the car. (R. 81, pp. 40-41). Based upon the 
deputy's experience, more times than not people that have been drinking have alcohol in their 
vehicle and they go hand in hand a great number of times. All of this played on the Deputy 
Jensen's mind as he went through this case and performed his search for alcohol. (R. 81, pp. 26-
27). The deputy also testified that he had cases where he stopped persons for alcohol related 
offenses and they did not have an open container in their vehicle. Additionally, the inference that 
every person who has had a drink is also drinking in their vehicle cannot be made. (R. 81, pp. 50-
51). Appellant was charged with one count of Theft, a class A misdemeanor. (R. 001-002). 
The Court found specifically that Deputy Jensen did not know whether the odor of alcohol 
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emanated from inside the car or whether the odor was emanating from the person of the driver 
himself. This, along with the totality of circumstances, the Court found that any further detention 
was reasonable and justified further investigation. The Court went further and held that Deputy 
Jensen had the right to investigate all alcohol-related offenses when the circumstances giving rise 
to the stop are also alcohol-related. (R. 81, pp. 78-82). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court abused it's discretion when it denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress, 
specifically finding that Deputy Jensen did not exceed the circumstances justifying the initial stop 
by further detaining defendant without articulating a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity. State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Shepard. 955 P.2d 352 
(Utah App. 1998). 
ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, specifically finding 
that Deputy Jensen did not exceed the circumstances justifying the initial stop by 
further detaining Appellant without articulating a reasonable suspicion of more 
serious criminal activity. 
After a stop of a vehicle has been made, "the detention 'must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. O'Brien. 959 P.2d 647, 
649 (Utah App. 1998); Citv of St. George v. Carter. 945 P.2d 165,169-70 (Utah App. 
1997)(quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "When making a routine traffic stop, 
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an officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and 
issue a citation." O'Brien at 649. 
"Once a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any detention for reasons exceeding the 
scope of the original stop and not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop in the 
first place, is illegal." Godina-Luna at 654 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)); State 
v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 437-38 (Utah App. 1990). In other words, "the length and scope of 
the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible." Godina-Luna at 654. 
Once the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed to 
proceed on his or her way. Id at 654-55. "Any further detention for investigative questioning 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." Shepard. at 355. 
"The reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of 
the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Id at 355. 
In the instant matter, there is no dispute that Deputy Jensen had effected a level two stop. 
See State v. Deitman 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(delineating three levels of police 
encounters, a level two stop allows an officer to seize a person if the officer has an articulable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime). After following 
Appellant for a brief distance, the deputy had some concerns the driver of the vehicle may be 
impaired. He had observed an erratic driving pattern, one characterized by weaving in and out of 
the designated travel lane. The vehicle then slowed down and eventually stopped alongside the 
curb. 
Deputy Jensen then activated his overhead lights and approached the vehicle. He 
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requested Appellant's driver license, registration and proof of insurance. At this point, the deputy 
detects an odor of alcohol which supports his initial suspicion of stopping the car, that of a 
possible impaired driver. However, the deputy is unable to determine at this point whether the 
odor of alcohol is coming from the person of the driver or from the vehicle. The deputy then 
requests Appellant to exit the vehicle to perform some field sobriety tests. After complying with 
Deputy Jensen's request, Appellant performs the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test ("HGN") and 
the deputy confirms the odor of alcohol is coming from Appellant's person. Of particular 
importance is the fact Deputy Jensen was aware of the source of the alcohol odor. 
The trial court specifically found the deputy was unaware of the source the odor. Due 
largely to this, the trial court further found the further detention and subsequent search were 
reasonable. However, due to the incorrect factual finding by the trial court, and in applying 
current case law, Deputy Jensen had not articulated a specific and reasonable suspicion on which 
to base his request to search or further detention. Moreover, the record shows that Deputy 
Jensen was aware of the source of the odor unlike the trial court's findings and articulated nothing 
about smelling an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle itself. 
Appellant admitted to the deputy that he had drank one beer earlier with a friend. After 
performing the HGN test, Deputy Jensen determined the test results were consistent with drinking 
one beer. Specifically, he found zero out of a possible six clues that he is trained to look for. 
Also, Appellant stated that he had just gotten off of work nearby at Smith's Warehouse. The 
deputy initiated the traffic stop at approximately 12:15 a.m.. and confirmed that Appellant's 
driving route was consistent with leaving Smith's Warehouse at that time of the evening. As a 
result, Deputy Jensen was unaware when and where Appellant actually had the one beer. Based 
9 
upon the HGN clues, the Appellant may have had a beer during his lunch break, prior to coming 
to work or even immediately after work. However, Deputy Jensen failed to pursue this line of 
questioning to confirm or deny any suspicions he may have had. 
Deputy Jensen had suspected a possible impaired driver. After alleviating his concerns 
regarding this matter, he did not proceed to run a computer check on Appellant's driver's license, 
registration, and proof of insurance as required under the law. He proceeds to request permission 
to search Appellant's vehicle based upon nothing more than a hunch. His past experience in 
dealing with alcohol related traffic stops provide the basis upon which Deputy Jensen requests 
permission to search. The deputy characterizes his basis for the search as a statement of 
possibility based upon his past experience with having some drivers who have been stopped as 
more times than not having an open container. He also states that many times persons stopped do 
not have open containers in their vehicles. 
Searches based upon hunches, regardless of the result, are per se unreasonable. In Godina-
Luna, this Court held "a hunch, without more, does not raise a reasonable articulable suspicion 
regardless of the final result." at 655. In Godina-Luna- this Court found that merely being 
nervous combined with proceeding in a less than direct route to one's destination does not rise to 
the level of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Likewise, the Appellant was subjected to 
further investigation due to transgressions and patterns of other drivers similarly situated. Deputy 
Jensen did not articulate a reasonable basis that Appellant may have an open container in his 
vehicle. 
Moreover, stopping a vehicle for possible DUI should not give an officer authority to 
search for any alcohol related offense. As a policy matter, to allow an officer such authority 
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would undermine Fourth Amendment protections and discard the current status of the law. More 
serious criminal activity is required and Deputy Jensen simply did not meet that standard. He 
simply went on the hunch that there may be an open container in the vehicle and proceeded to 
search based solely upon that. As a result, Appellant was not free to leave because the Deputy 
had not decided whether to arrest or not, and, had made no attempt to run a computer check of 
Appellant's information. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the trial court's error in not granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress, this 
Court should hold the subsequent search of Appellant's vehicle after the circumstances giving rise 
to the stop were satisfied, was unreasonable and, any evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful 
search be held inadmissible. 
Respectfully submitted this }&_ day of October, 2000. 
WCHARDAIJGALLEGOS 
Attorney forAppellant 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, two true and correct copies 
of Appellant's Brief to the following: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S. #600 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84011 
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DATED this _?L day of October, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT- LAYTON COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL TRUJILLO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SUPPRESSION HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 991600442 NO 
Judge: DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Date: August 11, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tacys 
Prosecutor: HARWARD, CARVEL R. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GALLEGOS, RICHARD 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 4, 1955 
Audio 
Tape Number: 772 Tape Count: 210 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT - Class A Misdemeanor 
HEARING 
COUNT: 260 
Plaintiff's Witness 1, Deputy Gary Jensen, Davis County Sheriff's 
Office, sworn & testifies. 
COUNT: 4810 
State presents closing arguments. 
COUNT: 5170 
Defense presents closing arguments. 
COUNT: 6900 
Findings: Officer's actions met both criteria on which the Court 
is basing decision not to suppress evidence: 1) there was 
articulable suspision of criminal conduct to justify stop; 2) 
totality of circumstances gave officer reasonable, articulable 
predicate to search for open container. Court also finds that 
Page 1 
Case No: 991600442 
Date: Aug 11, 1999 
there is no evidence that search was not voluntary. 
Notion to Suprress is denied. 
Attorney Gallegos indicates Defendant will plead. Pretrial set 
9/22/99 at 11:30am. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 09/22/1999 
Time: 11:30 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom #2 
JUDICIAL BUILDING 
425 NORTH WASATCH DRIVE 
LAYTON, UT 84041 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Kathy Powell 
at (801)451-4443 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)546*2484. 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
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4 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARWARD: 
Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, YOUR OCCUPATION OR 
PROFESSION, AND PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A BUSINESS ADDRESS? 
A. CERTAINLY. MY NAME IS GARY JENSEN. I'M A DEPUTY 
SHERIFF/PARAMEDIC FOR DAVIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, 
CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE PATROL DIVISION. AND THE ADDRESS 
OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT IS 800 WEST STATE STREET IN 
FARMINGTON. 
Q. ARE YOU A CERTIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER? 
A. YES, I AM. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A CERTIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICER? 
A. FOR 12 YEARS. 
Q. GIVE A VERY BRIEF ACCOUNTING OF YOUR CAREER DURING THOSE 
12 YEARS. 
A. FOR THE MAJORITY OF MY CAREER I'VE BEEN ASSIGNED TO 
PATROL FUNCTION; HOWEVER, VERY RECENTLY COMPLETED A TWO AND 
A HALF YEAR ASSIGNMENT TO THE DAVIS COUNTY METRO NARCOTICS 
STRIKE FORCE AS AN INVESTIGATOR. 
Q. WHAT IS YOUR LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION? 
A. I HAVE A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AS WELL 
AS AN ASSOCIATE'S DEGREE IN EMERGENCY CARE AND RESCUE. 
Q. YOU PARTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MATTER NOW 
BEFORE THE COURT? 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
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A. THAT'S CORRECT, I DID. 
Q. DID THE INCIDENT OCCUR ON THE 5TH OF FEBRUARY, 1999? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. WERE YOU ON DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. WHAT WAS YOUR SHIFT ON THAT DATE? 
A. MY SHIFT RAN FROM 6 P.M. ON THE 4TH TO 6 A.M. ON THE 
5TH. AND MY DUTY ASSIGNED AREA WAS WHAT WE REFER TO AS 
SECTOR ONE, AND THAT INCLUDES LAYTON, CLEARFIELD, SUNSET, 
SYRACUSE, ALL OF THE NORTHWESTERN AREA OF THE COUNTY. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF YOUR ASSIGNMENT? 
A. ONCE AGAIN, PATROL AND PARAMEDIC DUTIES IN THAT 
PARTICULAR SECTOR. 
Q. WERE YOU TRAVELING ALONE? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. WHAT KIND OF VEHICLE? 
A. A MARKED SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT VEHICLE. 
Q. AND UP UNTIL THE MOMENT YOU HAD CONTACT WITH 
MR. TRUJILLO, HOW HAD YOUR SHIFT GONE? WHAT HAD BEEN 
HAPPENING? 
A. IT WAS RELATIVELY A SLOW EVENING. I WAS JUST DOING SOME 
ROUTINE PATROL DOWN ON THE WEST END OF GENTILE. WE HAVE 
SOME COUNTY AREA RESPONSIBILITIES DOWN IN THAT AREA. AND 
HAD COMPLETED THAT PATROL AND WAS EASTBOUND ON GENTILE. 
Q. WERE YOU LOOKING FOR ANYTHING IN PARTICULAR? 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
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Q THAT'S LOCATED IN DAVIS COUNTY? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. IS IT WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF LAYTON, UTAH? 
A. IT'S ACTUALLY LAYTON CITY PROPER, YES. 
Q. APPROXIMATELY WHAT TIME? 
A. IT WAS APPROXIMATELY MIDNIGHT OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. 
Q. OKAY. DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENT. INCLUDE IN YOUR ANSWER 
WEATHER CONDITIONS, OTHER TRAFFIC, IF ANY, ANY SIGNIFICANT 
CIRCUMSTANCE. 
A. ACTUALLY IT WAS A VERY DARK NIGHT. THERE WAS NO WEATHER 
TO SPEAK OF SUCH AS RAIN OR SNOW OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. I 
DON'T RECALL WHETHER IT WAS OVERCAST OR NOT, BUT I DO RECALL 
IT WAS REASONABLY -- A REASONABLY DECENT EVENING WITH 
RESPECT TO WEATHER. COLD, OF COURSE, DURING THAT TIME OF 
YEAR, HOWEVER, NO SPECIFIC WEATHER THAT I RECALL. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE CONDITION OF THE ROADWAY? 
A. VERY DRY. 
Q. TRAFFIC? 
A. NO TRAFFIC TO SPEAK OF, THAT I RECALL. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT IN THE AREA? 
A. POSTED SPEED LIMIT ON GENTILE STREET AT THAT POINT I 
BELIEVE IS 35 MILES AN HOUR. 
Q. DESCRIBE THE LAYOUT OF THE ROADWAY IN THAT AREA. 
INCLUDE IN YOUR ANSWER THE APPROXIMATE WIDTH, HOW MANY LANES 
EACH WAY, ANY MARKING ON THE ROADWAY. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
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A. THIS ROADWAY IS A TWO-LANE ROADWAY. IT'S NOT PHYSICALLY 
DIVIDED. IT'S DIVIDED BY YOUR TYPICAL ORANGE MARKING. IT 
VARIES -- THE MARKING VARIES WITH RESPECT TO INTERSECTIONS 
AND RAILROAD TRACKS AND STUFF LIKE THAT FOR -- WHETHER IT 
HAS A DOUBLE SOLID YELLOW LINE OR WHETHER IT ACTUALLY JUST 
HAS THE BROKEN YELLOW LINE. BUT THERE IS A RAILROAD 
CROSSING IN THAT IMMEDIATE AREA AND THE ROADWAY WIDTH WOULD 
BE TYPICAL FOR THAT OF A TWO-LANE, NONPHYSICALLY DIVIDED 
ROADWAY. I CAN'T GIVE YOU REALLY SPECIFIC FOOT DIMENSIONS, 
BUT --
Q. ANY PARTICULAR IRREGULARITIES OR HAZARDS IN THE ROADWAY 
IN THAT LOCATION? 
A. NO, OTHER THAN -- I MEAN, IT'S A ROADWAY THAT'S NOT 
COMPLETELY CONSTRUCTED WITH CURB AND GUTTER. IT HAS YOUR 
DIRT SIDE WAYS. IT ALSO, ONCE AGAIN, HAS THAT RAILROAD 
CROSSING RIGHT THERE BY THE ONION PLANT, RIGHT THERE AS YOU 
WERE TO COME UP ONTO -- OH, HECK --
Q. WOULD YOU CONSIDER THE ROADWAY, GENERALLY SPEAKING, IN 
GOOD CONDITION? 
A. YES, I WOULD. 
Q. AND NO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. YOU SAW THE VEHICLE WHICH WAS OPERATED BY MR. TRUJILLO. 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. WHAT'S YOUR FIRST IMPRESSION OF THE VEHICLE? WHAT 
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ATTRACTED YOUR ATTENTION TO IT? 
A. WELL, AS I -- AS I APPROACHED THE VEHICLE, I WAS 
FOLLOWING THAT -- THAT PARTICULAR CAR. NOTHING IMMEDIATELY 
WAS APPARENT TO ME SUCH AS TAILLIGHTS OUT OR ANYTHING LIKE 
THAT, BUT AS I -- AS I CONTINUED TO FOLLOW, I NOTICED THIS 
VEHICLE WAS VERY ERRATIC WITH RESPECT TO BEING ABLE TO 
MAINTAIN A TRAVEL DIRECTION IN HIS RESPECTIVE TRAVEL LANE. 
IN OTHER WORDS --
Q. DESCRIBE WITH AS MUCH DETAIL AS YOU CAN. 
A. IN OTHER WORDS, THE VEHICLE LEFT ITS TRAVEL LANE. IF I 
MAY REFER TO MY REPORT, I THINK I WAS SPECIFIC. ACTUALLY, I 
DIDN'T SUGGEST IN MY REPORT AND DO NOT RECALL EXACTLY HOW 
MANY TIMES MR. TRUJILLO LEFT HIS TRAVEL LANE. I JUST MADE 
THE STATEMENT AND DO RECALL, ACTUALLY, OBSERVING THIS 
VEHICLE IN A WEAVING-TYPE PATTERN AS WE WENT EASTBOUND ON 
GENTILE. 
Q. NOW, CAN YOU PROVIDE THE COURT SOME DETAILS AS TO THE 
EXTENT OF EACH EXCURSION ON THE --ON THE WEAVE? 
A. IT WAS --IT WAS A SITUATION WHERE THE VEHICLE LEFT ITS 
TRAVEL LANE BY PROBABLY A TIRE WIDTH, IF THAT --IF THAT 
DRAWS YOU A PICTURE. WE'RE NOT TALKING ENTIRE CAR LENGTH 
OVER THE LANE DIVIDER. IN FACT, WE'RE NOT EVEN TALKING A 
QUARTER OF A CAR LENGTH. BUT MR. TRUJILLO DID BREAK THE 
CENTER MARKING, LANE DIVIDER SEVERAL TIMES IN THIS PERIOD 
THAT I WAS FOLLOWING HIM. 
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Q. NOW, AFTER THE STOP YOU RECEIVED SOME INFORMATION 
CONCERNING THE VEHICLE. LET'S GO TO THAT NOW. DESCRIBE THE 
VEHICLE. GIVE THE COURT THE MAKE, MODEL, THE CONDITION OF 
THE CAR, AS YOU OBSERVED IT. 
A. THIS IS A -- AN OLDER MODEL SEDAN. IT'S -- I BELIEVE 
IT'S A CHEVROLET PRODUCT, IF I'M NOT MISTAKEN. I DON'T 
RECALL THE SPECIFIC COLOR, AND I DO RECALL THAT THE VEHICLE 
WAS IN RELATIVELY GOOD REPAIR FOR ITS VINTAGE. I DIDN'T 
NOTICE ANY REAL PROBLEMS WITH THE VEHICLE, SUCH AS DENTS 
OR -- OR MECHANICAL FAILURE, ENGINE, MOTOR, ANYTHING LIKE 
THAT. IT SEEMED TO BE FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. 
Q. AND AFTER THE STOP YOU DETERMINED IT WAS PROPERLY 
REGISTERED --
A. YES. 
-- AND PROPERLY INSPECTED? 
YES. 
AND YOU SAW -- SAW NO DEFECT IN ANY OF THE EQUIPMENT? 
NOT THAT I RECALL, NO. 
ALL RIGHT. LET'S GO BACK TO THIS -- THIS DRIVING 
PATTERN. GIVE THE COURT REASONABLE PERSPECTIVE AS TO THE --
THE TIME INVOLVED AND THE DISTANCE TRAVELLED AS YOU'RE 
MAKING YOUR OBSERVATION. 
A. THE DISTANCE TRAVELLED WAS PROBABLY -- PROBABLY LESS 
THAN A MILE. AND CERTAINLY AT 35, 40 MILES AN HOUR IT -- IT 
ONLY TAKES A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME TO TRAVEL A DISTANCE OF A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I 
Q 
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MILE, PROBABLY LESS -- MAYBE A MINUTE OR TWO. SO IT WAS A 
BRIEF CONTACT, AND YET SIGNIFICANT DRIVING PATTERN IN THAT 
BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME. 
Q. DID YOU CONSIDER THE SPEED MR. TRUJILLO WAS DRIVING TO 
BE INAPPROPRIATE? 
A. I BELIEVE, AS I RECALL, THAT IT WAS WITHIN REASON. 
Q. SO NOTHING EXTRAORDINARY --
A. NO. 
Q. -- ABOUT THE SPEED? 
A. NO. 
Q. IT'S THE -- IT'S THE PATTERN THAT YOU CHARACTERIZED AS A 
WEAVE THAT CREATED THE CONCERN FOR YOU. 
A. CORRECT. UH-HUH. 
Q. NOW, DESCRIBE TO THE COURT, EVEN THOUGH YOU DIDN'T 
QUANTIFY THE NUMBER OF -- OF SWERVES, CHARACTERIZE THE BEST 
YOU CAN OVER THAT MILE WHAT -- WHAT YOU SAW. 
A. WELL, I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO THAT UNLESS I QUANTIFY IT. 
Q. WELL, WAS THERE -- WITHOUT COUNTING THE NUMBER, WOULD 
IT -- DID IT SEEM TO BE --
A. IT WAS --
Q. -- A DEFINITE PATTERN? 
A. IT WAS DEFINITELY NUMEROUS TIMES IN ORDER TO CAUSE ME 
THE CONCERN THAT I HAD. I DON'T --
Q. DID YOU -- DID YOU OBSERVE IT LONG ENOUGH THAT YOU WERE 
SATISFIED THERE HAD BEEN A PATTERN ESTABLISHED? 
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A. ABSOLUTELY. ABSOLUTELY. 
Q. NOT JUST AN OCCASION IRREGULAR MOVE? 
A. RIGHT. NO, THAT WAS VERY -- VERY DEFINITE IN MY MIND 
THAT -- THAT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS PATTERN. 
Q. TELL THE COURT THE BASIS FOR YOUR CONCERN. 
A. WELL, ONCE AGAIN, THE BASIS IS PROBABLY A COUPLE OF 
DIFFERENT FACTORS. FACTOR ONE MAY BE THAT THE TIME OF 
EVENING LENDS ITSELF TO THE IDEA OF MORE PEOPLE --IT SEEMS 
LIKE WE -- WE RUN INTO MORE SITUATIONS IN THE EVENING HOURS 
WITH RESPECT TO PEOPLE DRINKING AND DRIVING. SO --
Q. SO THAT'S BASED ON EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING? 
A. ABSOLUTELY. THAT -- THAT WAS A CONCERN, COUPLED WITH 
THE FACT THAT I'M FOLLOWING THIS GENTLEMAN FOR A MILE, MAYBE 
A LITTLE BIT MORE, FOR A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME AND HE HAS A 
PATTERN SUCH THAT IN THAT MINIMAL DISTANCE THAT CAUSES ME TO 
BELIEVE THAT HE VERY WELL MAY BE IMPAIRED. 
Q. NOW, DURING THE 12 YEARS YOU'VE BEEN AN OFFICER, MUCH OF 
THAT ON -- ON THE ROAD, YOU'VE HAD EXPERIENCE DETECTING AND 
ARRESTING THE IMPAIRED DRIVER? 
A. YES, I HAVE. 
Q. COULD YOU GIVE A BRIEF EXPLANATION TO THE COURT OF YOUR 
EXPERIENCE IN THAT REGARD? 
A. WELL, I'VE BEEN THROUGH COUNTLESS TRAINING HOURS, BEING 
CERTIFIED IN DIFFERENT AREAS SUCH AS DUI DETECTION, FIELD 
SOBRIETY, ALL THOSE TYPES OF TRAINING ISSUES REGARDING 
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ALCOHOL AND THE DRIVER. ONCE AGAIN, MY -- MY -- MOST OF MY 
CAREER, MINUS MY TWO AND A HALF YEARS WITH NARCOTICS, I HAVE 
BEEN A PATROL ASSIGNED OFFICER. AND THAT'S A LOT OF YEARS 
TO BE OUT THERE OBSERVING AND BECOMING FAMILIAR WITH 
PATTERNS AND ISSUES REGARDING INTOXICATED DRIVERS. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DO? 
A. WELL, IF -- IF I MAY, OTHER ITEMS THAT CONCERNED ME, 
SPECIFICALLY, WAS THAT THIS VEHICLE STOPPED --OR SLOWED 
DOWN AND BRIEFLY DROVE AT A VERY SLOW RATE OF SPEED, 5 MILES 
AN HOUR, IN A 35 MILE AN HOUR ZONE, BEFORE PULLING INTO A 
DRIVEWAY AND IMMEDIATELY PULLING BACK OUT AND DRIVING UP 
ONTO THE CURB. 
Q. NOW, AT THE TIME YOU DIDN'T KNOW THE INTENTION OF THE 
DRIVER. 
A. HAD NO IDEA WHAT WAS GOING ON. ACTUALLY --
Q. NOW -- NOW LATER, AFTER VISITING WITH HIM, YOU -- YOU 
LEARNED HIS EXPLANATION FOR SLOWING DOWN. 
A. MY THOUGHT AT THE TIME WAS THAT HE HAD NOTICED ME BEHIND 
HIM AND -- AND POSSIBLY WANTED TO PULL INTO A DRIVEWAY AND 
HAVE ME PASS ON BY. 
Q. SO YOU SAW HIM DRIVING ON THE -- THE ROADWAY AS YOU'VE 
DESCRIBED --
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. -- AND THEN SLOWING DOWN SUBSTANTIALLY. 
A. RIGHT. 
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THE PROCESS OF INITIATING A STOP? 
A. AS HE CAME TO REST ON THE CURB IS WHEN I PULLED UP 
BEHIND HIM AND ACTIVATED MY OVERHEAD LIGHTS. 
Q. SO YOU WERE ALREADY FOLLOWING HIM. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. AND YOU DIDN'T DO ANYTHING TO CAUSE HIM TO BRING HIS 
VEHICLE TO A STOP. 
A. NOTHING PHYSICALLY. I -- I SLOWED DOWN TO OBSERVE HIS 
PATTERN AS WELL, BUT MY LIGHTS DID NOT COME ON AT THAT 
POINT. 
Q. HAD HE ALREADY BROUGHT HIS VEHICLE TO A STOP BEFORE YOU 
ACTIVATED YOUR LIGHTS? 
A. YES. 
Q. EXPLAIN NOW WHAT YOU DID. 
A. WELL, AT THE POINT OF ACTIVATING MY EMERGENCY LIGHTS, I 
CAME TO A STOP AS WELL AND EXITED MY PATROL CAR. WALKED 
FORWARD AND MADE CONTACT WITH MR. TRUJILLO AT HIS VEHICLE. 
Q. WAS THERE ANYONE WITH HIM? 
A. NO, HE WAS ALONE IN THE VEHICLE. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. EXPLAIN NOW YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM. PROVIDE 
AS MUCH DETAIL AS YOU CAN. INCLUDE IN YOUR ANSWER WHAT YOT 
SAID, IF ANYTHING, WHAT HE SAID, IF ANYTHING, WHAT YOU 
OBSERVED, WHAT YOU DID. 
A. WELL, MY INITIAL CONTACT, I EXPLAINED TO MR. TRUJILLO 
WHY I HAD STOPPED HIM, SPECIFICALLY THAT I HAD OBSERVED A 
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DRIVING PATTERN, I HAD OBSERVED HIM PULL INTO THIS DRIVEWAY, 
RETURN TO THE ROADWAY AND THEN PARK ON THE CURB. I -- I 
EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON THAT I HAD STOPPED HIM 
AND ASKED HIM FOR AN EXPLANATION AND ASKED HIM FOR A 
DRIVER'S LICENSE AND REGISTRATION AND PROOF OF INSURANCE AT 
THAT POINT AS WELL. 
Q. DID HE -- DID HE RESPOND? 
A. HE DID. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS STOPPING AT THIS 
PARTICULAR RESIDENCE, IT WAS A FRIEND OF HIS, AND THAT HE 
WAS THERE TO VISIT. 
Q. DID YOU LATER DETERMINE WHETHER HE HAD ANYONE THAT HE 
WAS --
A. NO --
Q. -- ACQUAINTED WITH THERE? 
A. -- THAT WAS NOT HIS FRIEND'S HOUSE. 
Q. YOU DETERMINED IT WAS NOT? 
A. I BELIEVE THAT THAT'S THE -- THE STATEMENT THAT HE MADE 
TO ME AT THE TIME OF THE --
Q. BUT YOU DIDN'T CONFIRM IT? 
A. --OR LATER IN THE INVESTIGATION, ACTUALLY. 
Q. WELL, MY QUESTION IS, DID YOU DETERMINE IN THE COURSE OF 
YOUR INVESTIGATION WHETHER HE HAD AN ACQUAINTANCE AT THAT 
ADDRESS? 
A. THAT WAS PART OF OUR CONVERSATION AND I RECALL HIM 
SAYING THAT, IN FACT, THAT WAS NOT A FRIEND'S HOUSE. 
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ALSO --
Q. BUT INITIALLY HE HAD SAID THAT IT WAS --IT WAS --
A. HE WAS STOPPING THERE TO VISIT WITH A FRIEND. 
Q. AND LATER SAID THAT THAT WASN'T HIS FRIEND'S HOUSE? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. NOW, LET'S GO BACK TO THIS STOP, TAKE IT 
MOMENT BY MOMENT. 
A. OKAY. 
Q. WHAT WAS SAID, WHAT WAS DONE, WHAT WAS OBSERVED. 
A. ONCE AGAIN, I HAD ASKED HIM FOR AN EXPLANATION AND FOR 
THOSE ITEMS THAT I REQUESTED: DRIVER'S LICENSE, 
REGISTRATION, ET CETERA. 
DURING THE TIME THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITH MR. TRUJILLO, 
THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL WAS -- WAS APPARENT. I WAS NOT CLOSE 
ENOUGH TO HIM TO DECIDE WHETHER THE ALCOHOL ODOR WAS COMING 
FROM HIM OR COMING FROM HIS VEHICLE, BUT NEVERTHELESS I DID 
NOTE THE -- THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL. I ASKED MR. TRUJILLO IF 
HE'D BEEN DRINKING. HE ADMITTED THAT, IN FACT, HE HAD BEEN 
DRINKING. 
Q. DID HE TELL YOU WHERE, WHEN, AND HOW MUCH? 
A. HE DID NOT TELL ME WHEN OR WHERE OR HOW MUCH AT THIS 
POINT. ACTUALLY, I TAKE THAT BACK. HE DID STATE THAT HE 
HAD HAD ONE DRINK, ONE BEER. 
d. BUT HE DIDN'T TELL YOU WHERE, NOR WHEN? 
A. I DIDN'T ASK AND -- AND HE DIDN'T OFFER AT THAT POINT. 
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Q. DID HE TELL YOU WHERE HE HAD BEEN? 
A. I DIDN'T ASK THAT EITHER AT THIS POINT OF THE STOP. 
Q. BUT ANY TIME DURING YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM, DID HE TELL 
WHERE HE'D BEEN? 
A. YES. HE EXPLAINED TO ME THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM WORK 
AND THAT HE HAD VISITED A FRIEND BRIEFLY. 
Q. NOW, HOW LONG AFTER THE STOP DID HE TELL YOU THAT HE HAD 
JUST COME FROM WORK? 
A. OH, THIS WAS -- THIS WAS FIVE TO TEN MINUTES INTO THE 
STOP BEFORE WE GOT TO THE POINT OF ASKING THOSE TYPES OF 
QUESTIONS. 
Q. AND HE TOLD YOU HE'D JUST COME FROM WORK. DID HE TELL 
YOU WHERE HE'D BEEN WORKING? 
A. YES. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WORKED FOR SMITH'S WAREHOUSE. 
Q. DID YOU KNOW WHERE THAT FACILITY WAS? 
A. IT WAS DIRECTLY NORTH THROUGH THE FIELD FROM OUR 
LOCATION, ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE. 
Q. SO WAS HIS -- THE LOCATION OF HIS DRIVING CONSISTENT 
WITH HAVING DRIVEN FROM THAT WORKPLACE? 
A. CERTAINLY. YES. 
Q. AND DO YOU KNOW FROM YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE WHETHER THEY 
HAVE SHIFTS AROUND THE CLOCK OR AT LEAST UP TO MIDNIGHT? 
A. I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY OPERATE THEIR -- THEIR BUSINESS 
THERE AT SMITH'S WAREHOUSE, NO. 
Q. SO HE'D TOLD YOU THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM WORK --
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A. UH-HUH. 
Q. -- AND TOLD YOU THE LOCATION, AND WHERE HIS DRIVING WAS 
CONSISTENT HAVING BEEN DRIVING FROM THAT LOCATION. 
A. YES. 
Q. DID -- DID YOU DETERMINE -- NOW, INITIALLY WHEN YOU 
SMELLED THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL YOU DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER IT WAS 
ORIGINATING FROM THE CAR OR FROM MR. TRUJILLO. AS -- AS --
AS YOU'RE TALKING WITH HIM, DID YOU DETERMINE THAT HE HAD 
BEEN DRINKING, IN ADDITION TO HIM TELLING YOU THAT HE HAD? 
COULD YOU SMELL IT ON HIS BREATH? 
A. AFTER I ASKED HIM TO GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE. I ASKED 
HIM TO STEP OUT AND SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AND HE --
HE WAS WILLING TO DO THAT. AS HE GOT OUT OF THE VEHICLE AND 
MET ME BETWEEN MY PATROL CAR AND HIS VEHICLE AND I SET HIM 
UP TO START THESE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS, THERE WAS THE ODOR 
OF ALCOHOL ON MR. TRUJILLO. YES. 
Q. AND YOU WENT THROUGH A SEQUENCE OF SOBRIETY TESTS, AS 
YOU HAVE BEEN TRAINED? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. AND AS YOU'VE HAD EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD. AND YOU 
DETERMINED THAT HE WAS NOT IMPAIRED SUFFICIENTLY TO JUSTIFY 
AN ARREST. 
A. THAT IS CORRECT. I DID. 
Q. TELL THE COURT ABOUT THAT. 
A. WELL, ACTUALLY I DIDN'T GO THROUGH THE ENTIRE SET OF 
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FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. I ASKED MR. TRUJILLO TO SUBMIT TO A 
HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST. UPON COMPLETION OF THAT 
TEST I -- I'D NOTED ZERO OUT OF SIX WITH RESPECT TO THE 
FACTORS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR ON THAT TEST. THAT WOULD BE 
CONSISTENT WITH THE STATEMENT THAT MR. TRUJILLO GAVE ME THAT 
HE HAD ONLY HAD ONE DRINK THAT EVENING. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, A LOT OF PEOPLE TELL YOU THEY ONLY HAD ONE 
OR TWO BEERS. YOU'VE HAD -- THAT'S COMMON. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND HE TOLD YOU HE'D HAD ONE --
A. YES. 
Q. -- AND YOU DID THE TEST, AND YOU CONCLUDED IN HIS CASE 
WHAT YOU OBSERVED WAS CONSISTENT WITH THAT. 
A. I FELT THAT HE WAS -- YEAH, HIS STATEMENT WAS TRUE AND 
CORRECT. 
Q. DID YOU NOTICE ANY IMPAIRMENT? 
A. NO. ONCE AGAIN, I -- I SCORED HIM ZERO ON THE SIX 
POINTS OF THE HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS. SO IT CONCERNED --
IT DIDN'T CONCERN ME AT THAT POINT WITH RESPECT TO BEING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
Q. DID YOU FIND OUT FROM HIM WHERE AND WHEN HE HAD CONSUMED 
THE BEER? 
A. HE DID NOT SUGGEST TO ME WHERE HE HAD DRANK THE BEER AT, 
NO. 
Q. NOW, TELL THE COURT THE BEST YOU CAN HIS WORDS WHEN HE 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
23 
DIDN'T HAVE A FRIEND WHO LIVED THERE. 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. SO YOU HAVE HIM STOPPED. YOU DETERMINE THAT 
THERE WASN'T A BASIS FOR ARRESTING HIM FOR DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE. TELL THE COURT THE TIME FRAME FROM THE MOMENT 
YOU STOPPED HIM UNTIL YOU DETERMINED THAT YOU WEREN'T GOING 
TO ARREST HIM FOR DUI, HOW MANY MINUTES. 
A. THIS IS -- THIS IS A LESS THAN TEN-MINUTE SITUATION 
FROM -- FROM INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP THROUGH THE HORIZONTAL 
GAZE TEST. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. NOW, YOU SAID WHEN YOU FIRST APPROACHED THE 
CAR -- AND HE WAS IN THE CAR, OBVIOUSLY, WHEN YOU FIRST 
APPROACHED, YOU COULD SMELL THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL. 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. LATER DETERMINED THAT HE HAD BEEN CONSUMING. HE'S TOLD 
YOU THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM WORK. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DO? 
A. WELL, CERTAINLY WHERE HE HAD JUST LEFT WORK -- THIS IS A 
SECURE FACILITY. IN FACT, IT HAS A PHYSICAL GUARD AT THE 
FRONT GAIT. THIS IS A -- THIS IS A RELATIVELY SECURE OUTFIT 
THERE AT SMITH'S WAREHOUSE. MY CONCERN WAS IF HE HAD JUST 
CONSUMED ALCOHOL, WHERE WAS THE ALCOHOL? AND MY THOUGHT WAS 
THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IN THE VEHICLE, WHERE HE WAS NOT 
IMPAIRED, WHICH WOULD INDICATE TO ME THAT EVEN IF HE'D HAD A 
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BEER, IT HAD BEEN VERY RECENT AND MAY NOT BE AFFECTING HIM 
YET. AND POSSIBLY EVEN THE FACT THAT HE MAY HAVE BEEN 
CONSUMING IT PRIOR TO THE TRAFFIC STOP. 
MY CONCERN WAS IF HE'D JUST HAD THE ALCOHOL AND JUST 
GOTTEN OFF WORK, WHERE DID HE CONSUME THAT ALCOHOL AND WAS 
THE ALCOHOL STILL PRESENT IN HIS VEHICLE. 
Q. IN YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM, WHEN DID THOSE -- WHEN WERE 
THOSE THOUGHTS PROCESSED IN YOUR MIND? 
A. THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT IT'S ALWAYS A QUESTION, BUT UPON 
GETTING MORE FACTS, SPECIFICALLY, THE TIME FRAME FROM WHEN 
HE CAME FROM WORK AND HE ADMITTED JUST HAVING ONE BEER, IT 
WAS IMMEDIATE AFTER THE HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS THAT I 
REQUESTED PERMISSION TO CHECK FOR ALCOHOL IN HIS VEHICLE. 
MR. TRUJILLO --
Q. SO -- SO --
A. OH, GO AHEAD. I'M SORRY. 
Q. SO YOU ASKED HIM IF YOU COULD LOOK IN HIS VEHICLE. 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. HE CONSENTED TO THAT. 
A. YES. HE WAS VERY PLEASANT AND INVITED ME TO LOOK IN THE 
VEHICLE FOR ALCOHOL. 
Q. WHEN WAS THAT QUESTION ASKED IN RELATION TO WHEN YOU HAD' 
DECIDED YOU WEREN'T GOING TO ARREST HIM? 
A. IMMEDIATE. WHEN I DECIDED -- WHEN I RAN THE TEST ON HIM 
AND SAW THAT HE WASN'T GOING TO HAVE THE IMPAIRMENT THAT I 
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WOULD EXPECT IF I WERE GOING TO MAKE AN ARREST FOR DUI, WHEN 
I DECIDED THAT WASN'T THERE, THE QUESTION WAS IMMEDIATE, MAY 
I LOOK FOR THIS ALCOHOL THAT -- THAT I ASSUME IS PRESENT IN 
YOUR VEHICLE. 
Q. NOW, IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT HAD YOU CONCLUDED YOU WERE 
GOING TO ARREST HIM, THEN HIS CAR WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOUNDED, 
WOULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED ANYWAY? 
A. IF I HAD ARRESTED HIM? 
Q. YES. 
A. YES, I WOULD HAVE. 
Q. OKAY. SO WHEN YOU CONCLUDED THAT YOU WEREN'T GOING TO 
ARREST HIM, IMMEDIATELY YOU ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO LOOK IN 
HIS VEHICLE. 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. FOR? 
A. ALCOHOL. 
Q. ALCOHOL. HIS RESPONSE? 
A. HIS RESPONSE -- HE -- HE INVITED ME TO LOOK. GO AHEAD. 
THAT TYPE OF THING. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU DID IMMEDIATELY? 
\ 
A. YES, I DID. I ASKED MR. TRUJILLO TO STEP FORWARD. I 
HAD HIM STAND RIGHT BY THE FRONT OF HIS VEHICLE SO THAT I 
COULD KEEP AN EYE ON HIM AND DO MY JOB AT THE SAME TIME. 
MR. HARWARD: YOUR HONOR, IN -- IN THE INTEREST OF 
TIME, MAY I ASK COURT AND COUNSEL A QUESTION HERE. THERE'S 
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A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE THAT HAS TO DO WITH SOMETHING 
THAT WAS DISCOVERED. IS -- IS IT NECESSARY FOR ME TO GO 
INTO WHAT WAS DISCOVERED? THAT'S -- THAT'S NOT THE ISSUE 
HERE, IS IT? THE ISSUE IS THE LEGALITY OF THE OFFICER 
LOOKING IN THE CAR. DO I NEED TO GO FURTHER INTO WHAT WAS 
FOUND? THE -- THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS SEIZED THAT'S THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS CASE, DO I NEED TO DEVELOP THAT? 
THE COURT: MR. GALLEGOS, LET ME PASS THAT QUESTION 
ON TO YOU. WHAT'S YOUR VIEW? 
MR. GALLEGOS: YOUR HONOR, I -- SINCE WE'RE -- THE 
ISSUE IS LIMITED TO WHERE WE'RE AT RIGHT NOW, I'D FEEL 
COMFORTABLE ENDING IT AT THIS POINT AND JUST, YOU KNOW, 
DISCUSSING THE MATTER WHAT WE'RE CONCENTRATING ON SO --
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I APPRECIATE THAT, AND 
THAT'S THE COURT'S VIEW AS WELL. 
MR. HARWARD: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
Q. (BY MR. HARWARD) SO THE BASIS FOR YOU LOOKING IN THE 
CAR WAS YOU'VE ARTICULATED YOUR REASONING, AND THEN YOU 
ASKED IF YOU COULD LOOK IN THE CAR. MR. -- THE DEFENDANT 
GAVE YOU PERMISSION. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU DID -- AND YOU DID -- AND YOU DID SEARCH. 
A. IN MY EXPERIENCE, MORE TIMES THAN NOT PEOPLE THAT HAVE 
BEEN DRINKING HAVE ALCOHOL, AND THEY GO HAND IN HAND A GREAT 
NUMBER OF TIMES. AND THIS ALL PLAYED ON MY MIND AS I WENT 
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THROUGH THIS CASE. 
Q. AND THAT'S WHAT YOU WERE LOOKING FOR IS FOR ALCOHOL? 
A. CERTAINLY. 
Q. OKAY. AND IN SO DOING, YOU LOOKED WHERE YOU THOUGHT 
ALCOHOL MIGHT BE? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. WHAT ACTION BEYOND THAT DID YOU TAKE THAT EVENING? 
A. I DON'T KNOW HOW TO ANSWER THAT WITHOUT GOING --
Q. DO YOU --DO YOU LET HIM GO? WAS HE -- WAS HE TAKEN 
INTO CUSTODY THAT EVENING? 
A. HE WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY. 
Q. OKAY. BUT AS FAR AS YOU'RE CONCERNED, BEFORE YOU LOOKED 
IN THE CAR, YOU WERE GOING TO RELEASE HIM. 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. HE WAS FREE TO LEAVE. HAD YOU TOLD HIM HE WASN'T UNDER 
ARREST, THAT YOU WEREN'T GOING TO ARREST HIM? 
A. I HAD NOT TOLD HIM HE WAS UNDER ARREST AND I HAD NOT 
TOLD HIM HE WASN'T UNDER ARREST. MY INTENT AT THAT POINT 
WAS TO LOOK FOR ALCOHOL. IF ALCOHOL WAS DISCOVERED, TO 
ISSUE CITATIONS, AND -- AND TO CONCLUDE THE TRAFFIC STOP. 
Q. BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCE, HOW MUCH TIME WOULD IT HAVE 
TAKEN YOU TO LOOK FOR THE ALCOHOL? AFTER HE SAID YOU CAN 
LOOK, WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE MAXIMUM DELAY IN LOOKING AT 
HIS CAR? 
A. THAT'S A -- THAT'S A QUICK SEARCH. AND THE REASON I SAY 
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Q. AND WHEN YOU HAVE AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURS, YOU KNOW HOW 
IMPORTANT IT IS TO INCLUDE EVERYTHING IN YOUR REPORT. 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. AND YOU REALIZE THAT SOME DAY WE MAY END UP IN COURT, 
YOU KNOW, CONTESTING THE THINGS THAT ARE EITHER IN YOUR 
REPORT OR NOT IN YOUR REPORT. 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. OKAY. AND THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED ON FEBRUARY 5TH OF 
THIS LAST YEAR. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. WHICH -- WHICH HAS BEEN APPROXIMATELY SIX -- MORE THAN 
SIX MONTHS AGO. 
A. BEEN A WHILE, YES. 
Q. HOW MANY STOPS HAVE YOU MADE SINCE THEN? 
A. I'D -- I'D HESITATE TO EVEN SAY. HUNDREDS. 
Q. OKAY. HUNDREDS OF STOPS. 
A. HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS. 
Q. AND ON THIS PARTICULAR EVENING, I JUST WANT TO KIND OF 
GET WHERE WE'RE AT. SUGAR STREET ENDS AT GENTILE; ISN'T 
THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES, IT DOES. 
Q. OKAY. AND SO WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS WHEN YOU FIRST 
NOTICED THE DEFENDANT, HAD HE PULLED OUT OF SUGAR STREET OR 
WAS HE ON GENTILE? 
A. NO, HE PULLED OUT OF SUGAR. 
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Q. YOU SAW HIM PULL OUT OF SUGAR STREET --
A. YES. 
Q. -- ON TO GENTILE? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU WERE PROCEEDING EASTBOUND? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. OKAY. AND THEN YOU STATED THAT YOU WERE A QUARTER TO A 
HALF A MILE ONCE THE VEHICLE WAS STOPPED --
A. ROUGHLY HALF MILE, YEAH. 
Q. -- FROM SUGAR STREET. 
A. OR -- OR A LITTLE MORE, YEAH. 
Q. SO, I MEAN, YOU -- YOU DIDN'T REALLY FOLLOW HIM THAT FAR 
THEN, APPROXIMATELY A QUARTER OF A MILE TO A HALF MILE. 
A. WELL, ONCE AGAIN, YOU KNOW, YOU'RE THROWING A GUESS AT 
THE -- THE DISTANCE, BUT YEAH, I'M SAYING PROBABLY A HALF 
MILE OR A LITTLE BIT MORE. YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. AND I'M -- I'M JUST GOING OFF YOU STATED EARLIER 
THAT THE STOP -- THE CAR WAS ACTUALLY STOPPED A QUARTER TO A 
HALF A MILE EAST OF SUGAR STREET. 
A. OKAY. 
Q. WOULD THAT BE FAIR? 
A. THAT'S, LIKE I SAY, PRETTY CLOSE. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. HALF MILE, A LITTLE BIT MORE, WHATEVER. 
Q. SO YOU --SO YOU FOLLOWED HIM FOR APPROXIMATELY HALF A 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
39 
1 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
2 Q. SO THAT MAY HAVE BEEN ANOTHER DETAIL THAT YOU -- YOU 
3 JUST WAITED TO HERE TO TESTIFY ABOUT? 
4 A. (NO RESPONSE) 
5 Q. I MEAN, IS THAT -- I'M JUST GOING OFF YOUR REPORT. I'M 
6 JUST TRYING --
7 A. I UNDERSTAND THAT. 
8 Q. OKAY. AND THEN YOU STATED THAT THE -- THE -- YOU 
9 PULLED --AT THIS POINT YOU INITIATE THE TRAFFIC STOP, AND 
10 BASED ON A DRIVING PATTERN, YOUR CONCERN IS THAT IT MIGHT BE 
11 A POSSIBLE DUI; IS THAT CORRECT? 
12 A. THAT IS MY CONCERN AT THIS TIME. 
13 Q. SO YOU GO UP TO MR. TRUJILLO AND YOU ASK HIM FOR HIS 
14 DRIVER'S LICENSE AND REGISTRATION? 
15 A. I DID. 
16 Q. DO YOU RUN A -- DO YOU RUN A CHECK ON ALL OF THAT 
17 INFORMATION? 
18 A. I DID NOT AT THAT POINT, NO. 
19 Q. AT THAT POINT WHAT DID YOU DO? 
20 A. I EXPLAINED THE REASON FOR THE STOP. WAITED FOR HIS 
21 LICENSE AND REGISTRATION PAPERWORK. AND ONCE AGAIN, AT THAT 
22 POINT DEVELOPED THE IDEA AND THE ODOR THAT MR. TRUJILLO MAY 
23 BE INTOXICATED, BASED ON THE STOP, BASED ON THE ODOR. 
24 Q. OKAY. BUT YOU -- YOU HAD HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE AND 
25 REGISTRATION AT THIS POINT? 
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A. YEAH. HE -- AT THAT POINT HE WAS STILL WORKING THROUGH 
TRYING TO FIND IT AND GETTING IT TOGETHER TO GIVE TO ME. 
Q. DID HE EVENTUALLY GIVE IT TO YOU? 
A. YES, HE DID. 
Q. DID YOU RUN A CHECK ON IT? 
A. NOT AT THAT POINT. 
Q. OKAY. BUT AT WHAT POINT DID YOU -- DID YOU GO BACK TO 
THE CAR AND RUN A CHECK ON HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE AND 
REGISTRATION? 
A. AT -- AT ONE POINT, YES, I DID, BUT NOT AT THAT TIME, 
NO. 
Q. AT WHAT POINT OF THE STOP DID YOU DO THAT? 
A. WELL, AS TESTIFIED TO, HE WAS ASKED TO STEP OUT, TO 
SUBMIT TO THE SOBRIETY TEST. THEN THE QUESTION OF THE 
SEARCH CAME IN, HE ALLOWED ME TO DO SO. 
IT WAS AT THE TIME THAT I'D GOTTEN INFORMATION FROM 
YOUR CLIENT THAT NEEDED FOLLOW UP -- WITHOUT GOING INTO 
SPECIFIC DETAILS, I NEEDED TO CALL HIS SISTER TO -- TO SUM 
UP SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THAT I HAD ANSWERED BY MR. 
TRUJILLO. AND AT THAT TIME -- I HAVE A COMPUTER IN MY 
VEHICLE AND I WAS ABLE TO CHECK HIS LICENSE AND 
REGISTRATION. 
Q. OKAY. SO HE GAVE YOU -- IF I UNDERSTAND THIS CORRECTLY, 
HE GAVE YOU --AT ONE POINT HE GAVE YOU HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE 
AND REGISTRATION? 
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A. HE DID. 
Q. BUT YOU DIDN'T RUN A CHECK OR -- OR ATTEMPT TO GIVE THAT 
BACK TO HIM UNTIL AFTER YOU'D DONE THE -- THE FIELD SOBRIETY 
TEST AND YOU'VE SEARCHED THE CAR; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q. OKAY. OKAY. AGAIN, YOU ASKED HIM WHAT HE -- YOU ASKED 
FOR AN EXPLANATION; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD STOPPED TO VISIT A FRIEND? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. DID YOU GO UP TO THE HOUSE TO VERIFY IF THAT WAS, IN 
FACT, ONE OF HIS FRIENDS? 
A. NO, I DID NOT KNOCK ON THE DOOR. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. THIS IS MIDNIGHT, 0030, SOMETHING LIKE THAT AT THAT 
PARTICULAR TIME, AND NO, I DID NOT GO KNOCK ON THE DOOR. 
Q. BUT YOU HAVE A -- I MEAN, THERE'S A CONCERN THAT HE 
COULD BE LYING TO YOU, SO WOULDN'T THE PRUDENT THING BE TO 
GO UP AND SEE IF HE EVEN KNOWS WHO LIVES THERE? 
A. IT -- IT COULD HAVE BEEN SOMETHING THAT I MAY HAVE 
INVESTIGATED; HOWEVER, THIS WAS A DIFFICULT SITUATION IN 
THAT I HAD TAKEN ACTION, ASKED FOR LAYTON'S ASSISTANCE, AND 
LAYTON EXCUSED ME FROM THE CASE. SO I WAS NOT ABLE TO 
FINISH WHAT I FELT WOULD BE PRUDENT WITH RESPECT TO 
INVESTIGATING THE ENTIRE CASE HERE WHEN LAYTON ASKED TO HAVE 
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OF ALCOHOL. 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. OKAY. AND, AGAIN, I'M LOOKING IN YOUR REPORT AND I 
DON'T SEE ANY EVIDENCE OF THAT. YOU NOTED AN ODOR OF 
ALCOHOL, ACCORDING TO YOUR TESTIMONY. WHERE DID YOU FIRST 
NOTE THAT ODOR? 
A. AT THE TIME THAT I MADE CONTACT WITH MR. TRUJILLO AT HIS 
WINDOW. 
Q. OKAY. AND -- AND -- AND THAT'S WHEN YOU ASKED HIM IF 
HE'D BEEN DRINKING? 
A. I DID ASK HIM IF HE'D HAD ANYTHING TO DRINK THAT 
EVENING. 
Q. AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD HAD ONE BEER? 
A. YES, HE SAID THAT. 
Q. SO YOU PROCEED TO DO A FIELD SOBRIETY TEST, AND YOU ONLY 
PERFORM ONE. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. AND IN YOUR OPINION, IT'S CONSISTENT WITH HIM DRINKING 
ONE BEER. 
A. HE DIDN'T SHOW SIGNS THAT -- THAT I WOULD EXPECT FOR A 
PERSON THAT WAS INTOXICATED TO A POINT THAT I WOULD WANT TO 
ARREST THEM, THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. OKAY. GENERALLY, I KNOW WHEN A PERSON IS SUSPECTED 
OF -- OF DUI, THERE'S GENERALLY THREE STANDARD TESTS THAT 
THEY PERFORM. 
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A. ACTUALLY FOUR, BUT YES, THAT'S TRUE. 
Q. OKAY. AND SO YOU DIDN'T FEEL THE NEED TO DO ANY MORE? 
A. I DID NOT. I WAS VERY SATISFIED AT THAT POINT. 
Q. BECAUSE YOU HAD -- YOU HAD INITIALLY SUSPECTED HIM OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. AND YOUR CONCERNS WERE ABATED. 
A. YES. 
Q. YOU FELT THAT HE WAS SAFE TO DRIVE. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU EVEN NOTED IN YOUR REPORT: I FELT THAT CARL WAS 
NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. WHEN HE STATED THAT HE HAD HAD ONE BEER, DID YOU 
ASK HIM WHERE HE HAD IT? 
A. I DID NOT. 
Q. AND YOU DIDN'T ASK HIM WHEN HE HAD HAD IT? 
A. NO, MY -- MY CONCERNS WERE MORE IMMEDIATE THAN THAT, AND 
THAT BEING THE ISSUE OF, FIRST OF ALL, SAFETY, GETTING HIM 
OUT, MAKING SURE EVERYTHING WAS OKAY, AND -- AND GOING 
THROUGH THE TESTS. 
Q. THE INITIAL CONCERN, FOR THE OFFICER'S SAFETY? 
A. CERTAINLY. ALWAYS. 
Q. OKAY. YEAH. AND THAT'S UNDERSTANDABLE. BUT WHEN YOU 
HAD HIM OUT FOR THE TESTS, YOU DIDN'T ASK HIM WHEN HE HAD 
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HAD THE BEER? 
A. I DID NOT. 
Q. AND YOU DIDN'T ASK HIM WHERE HE HAD HAD IT? 
A. I DID NOT. 
Q. OKAY. AND HE HAD EXPLAINED TO YOU THAT HE WAS COMING 
FROM SMITH'S? 
A. SAID HE'D JUST GOTTEN OFF WORK. HE DIDN'T EVER SUGGEST 
IT WAS SMITH'S UNTIL LATER ON. 
Q. OKAY. DID YOU INQUIRE WHERE HE WORKED? 
A. LATER IN THE INVESTIGATION I DID. 
Q. SO HIM SAYING THAT HE JUST GOT OFF WORK, DID THAT RAISE 
ANY RED FLAGS FOR YOU? 
A. "RED FLAGS" MEANING WHAT? 
Q. I MEAN, I DON'T KNOW. I -- I JUST --IT SEEMS IMPORTANT 
TO ME IF SOMEONE'S DRIVING AT MIDNIGHT AND -- AND THEY SAY 
THEY JUST GOT OFF WORK, I -- I THINK THAT'S IMPORTANT -- I 
WOULD THINK THAT THAT'S IMPORTANT AS FAR AS INVESTIGATING 
SOMETHING RATHER THAN IF THEY'RE JUST -- YOU KNOW, MAYBE 
THEY'RE COMING FROM A CRIME OR SOMETHING, I DON'T KNOW. I 
MEAN, YOU'RE THE OFFICER. 
A. I'M NOT QUITE SURE WHAT YOU'RE GETTING AT. I'M SORRY. 
Q. WELL, I MEAN, WAS IT IMPORTANT AT 12 -- OR AT -- AT 
12:15, MIDNIGHT, IN THE MORNING, THAT SOMEBODY'S DRIVING AND 
YOU INITIATE A STOP, IS -- IS IT UNCOMMON FOR SOMEONE TO SAY 
THAT THEY'RE JUST GETTING OFF WORK? 
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A. I DON'T -- NO, I DON'T BELIEVE SO. 
Q. SO YOU --
A. I MEAN, FOLKS WORK ALL TIMES OF THE DAY. 
Q. -- YOU BELIEVED HIM WHEN HE TOLD YOU HE'D JUST GOTTEN 
OFF WORK. 
A. SURE. 
Q. OKAY. AND THEN YOU STATED THAT YOU'RE NOT AWARE IF 
SMITH'S WORKS AROUND THE CLOCK? 
A. NO, I KNOW THEY WORK AROUND THE CLOCK, BUT I DON'T KNOW 
WHAT THEIR SHIFT SCHEDULING IS LIKE. 
Q. OH, OKAY. 
A. I KNOW THEY'RE A 24-HOUR OUTFIT. 
Q. OKAY. AND SO YOU INITIALLY SMELL THE ALCOHOL WHEN YOU 
FIRST APPROACH THE VEHICLE, AND THEN YOU REQUESTED HIM TO 
COME OUT AND DO THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS? 
A. (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.) 
Q. AND HE PASSED THAT, AND SO YOU -- AS FAR AS YOU WERE 
CONCERNED, HE WASN'T UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND -- AND 
ACCORDING, I GUESS, TO YOUR LACK OF QUESTIONING HIM, HE 
WASN'T DRINKING. I MEAN, DID YOU ASK HIM IF HE HAD A -- HAD 
A BEER IN THE CAR? 
A. I ASKED HIM IF HE'D HAD A DRINK AND HE SAID YES, I'VE 
HAD ONE. 
Q. DID YOU ASK HIM IF HE'D BEEN DRINKING IN THE CAR? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
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PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER THAT THERE MAY BE AN OPEN CONTAINER 
IN THE VEHICLE? 
A. IS THAT A QUESTION? I'M SORRY. 
Q. WELL, I'M -- I'M ASKING -- YOU STATED -- AND YEAH, IT IS 
A QUESTION BECAUSE I'M NOT UNDERSTANDING YOUR TESTIMONY. 
YOU STATED THAT YOU HAD A CONCERN WHERE THE ALCOHOL WAS 
BECAUSE SMITH'S IS A SECURE FACILITY. AND SO I GUESS MY 
QUESTION IS, YOU HAD A CONCERN, BUT YOU NEVER QUESTIONED HIM 
WHEN HE HAD A DRINK; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. I THINK MY CONCERN WAS GOING TO BE ANSWERED THROUGH A 
BRIEF LOOK IN THE VEHICLE, WHETHER THERE WAS AN OPEN 
CONTAINER, BECAUSE I REALLY DIDN'T -- I MEAN --
Q. BUT I -- MY QUESTION IS, YOU HAD A CONCERN THAT THERE 
WAS AN OPEN CONTAINER --
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. -- BUT YOU NEVER ASKED HIM WHEN HE HAD A DRINK; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. AND YOU NEVER ASKED HIM WHERE HE HAD THE DRINK? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. SO HE HAD --HE TOLD YOU HE HAD ONE DRINK. THAT COULD 
HAVE BEEN 5 O'CLOCK THAT EVENING. 
A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO YOU, SIR, AND YOUR CLIENT, I'M 
NOT SURE THAT THOSE QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE ALLEVIATED THE FACT 
THAT I WAS STILL CONCERNED THAT THERE MAY BE AN ALCOHOLIC 
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BEVERAGE IN THE VEHICLE. HAD HE SAID NO, I DON'T HAVE ONE 
IN THE CAR; FORGIVE ME, BUT I HAVE PEOPLE THAT TELL ME 
UNTRUTHS EVERY DAY. AND ONCE AGAIN, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, 
IT WOULD HAVE STILL BEEN A CONCERN. SO NO, I DID NOT 
ANSWER (SIC) THOSE QUESTIONS THAT YOU --
Q. BUT UP TO THIS POINT HE HADN'T LIED TO YOU; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. NOT THAT I WAS AWARE OF AT THAT POINT. NO. 
Q. RIGHT. I MEAN YOU HAD ASKED HIM IF HE'D BEEN DRINKING, 
HE STATED YES. YOU ASKED HIM HOW MANY, HE SAID ONE BEER. 
YOU PERFORMED THE TEST AND IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH ONE BEER. 
A. YEAH. 
Q. SO THERE WAS NOTHING TO THIS POINT TO LEAD YOU THAT HE'S 
LYING TO YOU? 
A. NOTHING TO THAT POINT, CORRECT. 
Q. OTHER THAN EVERYONE ELSE YOU DEAL WITH, THAT YOU THINK 
PEOPLE LIE SO YOU WANTED TO SEARCH THE CAR. 
A. WELL, ONCE AGAIN, IT'S -- IT'S NOT POINTED AT YOU OR 
YOUR CLIENT. IT -- IT'S MERELY --
Q. I UNDERSTAND THAT. 
A. -- A STATEMENT OF POSSIBILITY, IF YOU WILL. I'M NOT 
SURE THAT THOSE QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE SATISFIED WHAT, IN 
FACT, I WAS TRYING TO GET AT. 
Q. OKAY. AND -- AND YOU STATED EARLIER -- OR IN YOUR 
TESTIMONY THAT YOU REQUESTED OR YOU ASKED HIM IF YOU COULD 
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SEARCH THE AL -- OR THE CAR FOR ALCOHOL. 
A. YES, THAT'S CORRECT. I DID TESTIFY TO THAT. 
Q. AND WHAT WAS HIS STATEMENT TO YOU? 
A. HE SAID, GO AHEAD. HE INVITED ME TO DO SO. HE WAS VERY 
PLEASANT. 
Q. AND HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT HE -- HE -- HOW DO YOU KNOW 
THAT HE SAID THAT? 
A. BECAUSE I WAS STANDING THERE AND HE VERBALIZED IT TO ME. 
Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT HE SAID, EXACTLY? 
A. NO, I DON'T. I MEAN, ONCE AGAIN, HE INVITED ME TO GO 
AHEAD AND LOOK. HE SAID, GO AHEAD. HIS EXACT WORDS, I DID 
NOT QUOTE, BUT THAT WAS WHAT HE ASKED ME TO DO, WAS GO AHEAD 
AND LOOK. 
Q. SO BASICALLY -- AND I'M GOING OFF OF YOUR REPORT -- YOU 
STATED THAT CARL INVITED YOU TO DO SO. 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. SO YOU KNOW THAT YOU GOT CONSENT BECAUSE YOU WROTE IN 
THE REPORT? 
A. I KNOW I GOT CONSENT BECAUSE MR. TRUJILLO GAVE IT TO ME. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU STATED THAT PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN DRINKING 
ALCOHOL, YOU KNOW, THE GENERAL PUBLIC, USUALLY WHEN YOU PULL 
THEM OVER -- A LOT OF TIMES THEY HAVE AN OPEN CONTAINER ON 
THEM. 
A. IT'S -- YEAH, IT'S TYPICAL THAT THAT OCCUR. 
Q. IS THERE EVER ANY CASES WHERE THEY DON'T HAVE AN OPEN 
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CONTAINER? 
A. ABSOLUTELY. YOU BET. 
Q. OKAY. SO IT -- YOU KNOW, NOT -- YOU CAN'T MAKE THAT 
INFERENCE THEN THAT EVERY PERSON WHO'S DRINK -- WHO'S HAD A 
DRINK IS DRINKING IN THEIR VEHICLE. 
A. NO, I CANNOT. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. NO, ABSOLUTELY NOT. 
Q. AND THEN YOU STATED THAT YOU WANTED TO SEARCH FOR THE 
ALCOHOL AND THAT IT WOULD ONLY TAKE A MINUTE OR SO. 
A. NO. I TESTIFIED THAT I ASKED FOR THAT, HE GAVE ME 
PERMISSION, AND THAT IT DID ONLY TAKE ABOUT A MINUTE. 
Q. BUT WHEN YOU ASKED FOR HIS PERMISSION, YOU WERE STILL 
HOLDING HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE AND REGISTRATION; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. OKAY. 
MR. GALLEGOS: AND I BELIEVE THAT'S ALL I HAVE, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. GALLEGOS. 
ANY REDIRECT? 
MR. HARWARD: YES. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARWARD: 
Q. I HAVE A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SEQUENCE OF YOUR REPORT 
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SUBMIT IT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
GENTLEMEN, I APPRECIATE THE -- THE BRIEFING, AND 
MR. HARWARD IS RIGHT. I THINK THE DEFENDANT'S -- THE 
DEFENDANT --MR. GALLEGOS HAS FILED A FIRST-RATE BRIEFING IN 
THIS CASE, AND I APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH. 
MR. GALLEGOS: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: AND I THINK THE STATE OF THE LAW -- THE 
STATEMENT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS, LIKEWISE, IS A CORRECT 
STATEMENT IN BOTH BRIEFS. 
AND I ALSO AGREE THAT IT IS VERY FACT SPECIFIC. THE 
ONLY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT IS, IN FACT, THE OFFICER'S 
TESTIMONY. 
LET ME JUST INDICATE TO YOU, BASICALLY, THE COURT'S 
FINDINGS. WITH REFERENCE TO THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT -- AND THAT IS SET FORTH IN THE 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM -- FOR STOPPING A VEHICLE, IT IS A 
TWO-PRONG TEST AND THE FIRST TEST IS WHETHER OR NOT THE 
INITIAL STOP MAY BE JUSTIFIED. AND IT'S JUSTIFIED IF THERE 
IS A FACTUAL PREDICATE GIVING RISE TO THE OFFICER HAVING A 
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT. 
NOW, LET ME ADDRESS THAT ISSUE FIRST. THE OFFICER IS 
DRIVING DOWN THE ROADWAY AND HE SEES A VEHICLE IN FRONT OF 
HIM GOING ABOUT -- NOT TOO FAST, NOT TOO SLOW, BUT WEAVING. 
NOW, THE OFFICER INDICATES IN HIS TESTIMONY TODAY THAT THE 
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WEAVING CROSSED THE MIDDLE LINE. MIDDLE LINE WAS NOT 
MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY IN THE REPORT. BUT ON THE OTHER 
HAND, THE REPORT DOES INDICATE TRAVEL -- AND I'M SAYING -- I 
DON'T HAVE THE REPORT BEFORE ME, BUT BASED UPON THE 
TESTIMONY, AS QUOTED BY COUNSEL, THE REPORT SAYS: TRAVELING 
INSIDE AND OUT OF THE LANE, WEAVING. 
NOW, YOU -- YOU CAN ARGUE THAT THE OFFICER MIGHT HAVE 
SAID OUTSIDE THE LANE BY CROSSING THE MIDDLE LINE, AND ARGUE 
THAT PERHAPS THE REPORT IS NOT AS SPECIFIC AS IT MIGHT 
OTHERWISE BE. BUT THE COURT DOES NOT FIND INCONSISTENCY 
BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY UNDER OATH AT TRIAL -- THAT IS, AT 
THIS HEARING, WHERE HE SAYS THE DEFENDANT CROSSED THE CENTER 
LINE BY THE WIDTH OF THE TIRE, AND THE REPORT THAT INDICATES 
THAT HE'S TRAVELING INSIDE AND OUT OF THE LANE. 
MOREOVER, THE COURT PUTS ITSELF IN A POSITION -- WELL, 
STRIKE THAT. THE COURT VIEWS THE FACTUAL MATTER IN THIS 
CASE, AND IT'S LATE AT NIGHT. THE CAR IN FRONT IS WEAVING 
INSIDE THE LANE AND OUTSIDE. AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES 
THE COURT FINDS THERE IS A FACTUAL PREDICATE TO GIVE THE 
OFFICER A -- AN ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT THERE MAY BE 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT. 
AND IN THIS CASE THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT VERY WELL MAY BE 
DRIVING AFTER CONSUMING ALCOHOL TO THE POINT WHERE THE 
PERSON WHO IS DRIVING ALCOHOL -- I MEAN DRINKING ALCOHOL, 
THE DRIVER OF THE COURT --OF THE CAR IN THIS CASE, MAY NOT 
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BE ABLE TO DO SO SAFELY. 
THEREFORE, THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FINDS, AS INDICATED, 
THAT THE OFFICER DOES MEET PRONG ONE OF THE TEST. THAT 
THERE WAS AND IS AN ARTICULABLE SUSPICION AS TESTIFIED BY 
THE OFFICER THAT GAVE RISE TO THE RIGHT OF THE OFFICER TO 
BRING THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE TO A STOP FOR FURTHER 
INVESTIGATION. 
NOW, THIS ARTICULABLE SUSPICION, THE REASONABLE ASPECT 
OF IT, DOESN'T RISE TO THE LEVEL OF PROBABLE CAUSE. COUNSEL 
AND THE COURT UNDERSTAND THAT. IT -- IT JUST SIMPLY IS 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUFFICIENT INDICIA FOR A REASONABLE 
POLICE OFFICER TO SUSPECT THAT CRIMINAL CONDUCT IS IN 
PROCESS. AND -- AND WEAVING OF A VEHICLE IN AND OUT OF THE 
LANE OF TRAVEL, THE COURT CONCLUDES MEETS THAT PARTICULAR 
FIRST PRONG OF THE TEST AND GIVES THE OFFICER THE RIGHT TO 
BE ABLE TO BRING THE VEHICLE TO A STOP. 
NOW, THE SECOND PRONG OF THE TEST IS THAT SUBSEQUENT 
ACTIONS MUST BE WITHIN THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
WITH RESPECT TO THE INVESTIGATION. AND, AGAIN, OUR COURT, 
IN LOOKING AT THAT, HAS INDICATED THAT THE OFFICER'S 
INVESTIGATION AND THE SCOPE OF THAT INVESTIGATION, TO 
INCLUDE WHAT IS DONE AND THE TIME SPENT, MUST BE REASONABLE. 
AND IF ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION IS PURSUED, THE OFFICER MUST 
BE ABLE, AGAIN, TO ARTICULATE A PREDICATE FOR THAT 
ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION. 
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THEREFORE, WHAT WE HAVE IN THIS CASE IS THE POLICE 
OFFICER ASKING THE DRIVER FOR HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE, EVIDENCE 
OF INSURANCE, AND FOR REGISTRATION, THE FIRST QUESTION AN 
OFFICER ASKS ANY DRIVER WHO IS STOPPED. IT WAS PRODUCED. 
THE OFFICER THEN ASKED THE DEFENDANT TO EXIT THE 
VEHICLE, WHICH HE DID, AND THE OFFICER SAID HE ATTEMPTED --
WELL, THE OFFICER SAID HE COULD SMELL THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL, 
BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER THAT ODOR EMANATED FROM INSIDE 
THE CAR OR WHETHER THE ODOR -- ODOR WAS EMANATING FROM THE 
PERSON OF THE DRIVER HIMSELF. 
THAT, IN AND OF ITSELF, IN THE COURT'S MIND GIVES 
JUSTIFICATION FOR INVESTIGATION WHICH GOES A STEP FURTHER 
THAN SIMPLY FOCUSING ON THE DEFENDANT AND MAKING A JUDGMENT 
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT IS TOO IMPAIRED, DUE TO 
ALCOHOL, TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE. 
SO WHAT DOES THE OFFICER DO? THE FIRST THING HE DOES 
THEN IS GIVE THE -- THE STAG -- I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU SAY 
THAT WORD -- THE EYE TEST, AND -- AND CONCLUDES, AFTER 
GIVING THAT TEST, THAT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THE DEFENDANT IS 
NOT IMPAIRED DUE TO THE DRINKING OF ALCOHOL. 
THAT SUGGESTS TO THE COURT THAT THERE'S SOME 
OBJECTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICER IN MAKING THAT 
JUDGMENT. IT SUGGESTS TO THE COURT THE OFFICER IS NOT 
TRYING TO CONJURE UP TESTIMONY TO JUSTIFY A STOP. 
THE DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES TO THE OFFICER THAT HE HAD A 
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BEER. THE DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES TO THE OFFICER THAT HE'S 
EMPLOYED AT SMITH'S WAREHOUSE THAT'S WITHIN A HALF A MILE 
AWAY. THE OFFICER STARTS FOLLOWING THE DEFENDANT ON SUGAR 
STREET, HE TURNS ONTO GENTILE, AND THE OFFICER FOLLOWS HIM 
UP GENTILE GOING EAST, WITHIN A VERY SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE 
SMITH'S WAREHOUSE. HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED DRINKING ALCOHOL, 
BUT HIS CONDUCT DOESN'T SUGGEST IMPAIRMENT. 
IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO THE COURT THAT THAT PREDICATE 
JUSTIFIES AN INQUIRY OF THE DEFENDANT TO SEE IF THERE IS AN 
OPEN CONTAINER IN THE VEHICLE. NOT TO DO SO, IN THE COURT'S 
MIND, GIVEN THE FACTUAL PREDICATE OF THIS CASE AND THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SUGGESTS THAT THE OFFICER MAY 
BE LETTING A PERSON LEAVE, WHO'S DRINKING ALCOHOL IN THE 
CAR, TO CARRY ON DOWN THE HIGHWAY, AND IT'S UNSAFE FOR THE 
PUBLIC. 
IT SEEMS TO THE COURT THAT, INDEED, FOR -- THAT THE 
OFFICER MUST TAKE AT LEAST ONE MORE ELEMENT OF THE 
INVESTIGATION IN THE TOTALITY AND SEE IF THERE IS AN OPEN 
VEHICLE IN THE --IN THE --AN OPEN CONTAINER IN THE 
VEHICLE. 
NOW, COUNSEL, YOU INDICATE THAT -- THAT TO EXTEND THE 
SEARCH TO THAT POINT ONCE YOU DECIDE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT, 
AT THE MOMENT, IMPAIRED IN HIS DRIVING, EXTENDS BEYOND THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, AND THE COURT 
RESPECTFULLY DISAGREES WITH YOU. I THINK THERE IS A FACTUAL 
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PREDICATE IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS 
RECENTLY COMING FROM A LOCATION, WHERE HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED 
CONSUMING ALCOHOL, TO CHECK TO SEE IF THERE'S FURTHER 
ALCOHOL IN THE VEHICLE. 
NOW, THE QUESTION WASN'T ASKED OF THE DEFENDANT. THE 
COURT CONCLUDES THE QUESTION DOESN'T NEED TO BE ASKED. 
INVESTIGATION ISN'T ALWAYS SIMPLY ASKING A QUESTION AND 
RELYING UPON IT. INVESTIGATION OFTEN IS TO LOOK AT THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, MAKE A REASONABLE JUDGMENT, 
AND THEN MAKE INQUIRY IN THIS CASE TO SEARCH THE CAR, GET 
PERMISSION, AND LOOK FOR THE ALCOHOL. 
IF THE OFFICER, INDEED, HAD ASKED THE QUESTION AND THE 
DRIVER SAID, I DON'T HAVE ANY; I WOULD EXPECT THE OFFICER TO 
SEARCH ANYWAY. THAT IS ONLY AN APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATIVE 
APPROACH, IN THE COURT'S MIND. 
SO, THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THAT PRONG NUMBER TWO 
HAS BEEN MET. THAT, INDEED, THERE IS REASONABLE, 
ARTICULABLE -- THERE IS A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE PREDICATE 
GIVEN THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, LOOKING AT THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, FOR THE OFFICER TO HAVE LOOKED IN THE VEHICLE 
TO SEE IF THERE IS AN OPEN CONTAINER. 
THE ONLY PERSON THAT WAS THERE THAT NIGHT IS THE 
DRIVER. HE WAS -- AND IT WAS HIS CAR, AND THAT SEARCH WAS 
MADE WITH THE DRIVER'S CONSENT. THERE IS NOTHING BEFORE THE 
COURT BY WAY OF TESTIMONY, BY WAY OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, 
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OR BY WAY OF WRITTEN MEMORANDA THAT THE SEARCH THAT WAS 
CONSENTED TO, THAT THE CONSENT WAS PREDICATED UPON COERCION 
OR SOME OTHER FACTOR EXISTING THAT NIGHT THAT WOULD GIVE 
RISE TO ONE QUESTIONING WHETHER THE CONSENT, INDEED, WAS 
VOLUNTARY. AND, THEREFORE, THE COURT DOES NOT FIND ON THAT 
ISSUE THAT THE CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY. I HAVE NO 
EVIDENCE BEFORE ME OTHER THAN THAT IT WAS VOLUNTARY. 
NOW, COUNSEL HAS ARGUED THAT THE OFFICER HAD THE 
DRIVER'S LICENSE AND ALSO THE INSURANCE CARD AND ALSO THE 
REGISTRATION AND HADN'T RETURNED IT TO THE DEFENDANT. 
THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT ASKED FOR IT. 
THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT FELT THAT HE WAS 
OBLIGED TO CONSENT TO THE SEARCH UNTIL THAT INFORMATION WAS 
RETURNED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CONSENT OF THE 
SEARCH OCCURRED AFTER OTHER OFFICERS ARRIVED AT THE SCENE. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE OFFICER, UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, PLACED ANY COERCION WHATSOEVER ON THE 
DEFENDANT WITH REFERENCE TO OBTAINING A CONSENT TO THE 
SEARCH. 
AND, THEREFORE, I FIND THAT PRONG NUMBER TWO OF 
STOPPING VEHICLE AND INVESTIGATING HAS BEEN MET FOR THE 
REASONS THAT I'VE INDICATED. 
AND MR. GALLEGOS, FOR -- FOR YOU AND MR. TRUJILLO, 
WHILE I COMMEND THE -- THE -- THE ARGUMENT AND CERTAINLY 
INDICATE THAT IT HAS MERIT, BUT I RESPECTFULLY DENY THE 
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE TESTIMONY. AND THAT'S THE ORDER OF 
THE COURT. 
ANYTHING FURTHER, COUNSEL? 
MR. GALLEGOS: YOUR HONOR, I JUST HAVE A QUESTION 
THEN. SO DID THE COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE OPEN 
CONTAINER IS MORE SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTIVITY THAN A DUI? 
THE COURT: THE -- THE COURT --IN TERMS OF THE 
SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CASE, THE COURT IS GOING TO MAKE A 
JUDGMENT THAT IN -- IN TERMS OF -- IN TERMS OF SEARCHING THE 
MATTER FURTHER, FOR THE REASONS THAT I'VE INDICATED, THAT 
THIS IS AN ALCOHOL-RELATED STOP AND THAT THE POLICE OFFICER 
HAS THE RIGHT TO INVESTIGATE ALL ALCOHOL-RELATED OFFENSES. 
MR. GALLEGOS: OKAY. 
MR. HARWARD: DO WE NEED A DATE FOR -- WELL, AM I 
INTERRUPTING OR IS THAT -- WAS THAT THE END OF YOUR --
MR. GALLEGOS: NO, I -- I WAS DONE. 
MR. HARWARD: DO WE NEED A DATE FOR NEXT --
THE COURT: WHAT WE -- WELL, THE NEXT STEP IN THIS 
CASE IS THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS FILED -- HAS OBVIOUSLY PLED 
NOT GUILTY, AND APPROPRIATELY SO. AND THIS SUPPRESSION 
HEARING NOW HAS BEEN HEARD, SO WHAT WE NEED TO DO IS SET THE 
MATTER -- THIS IS A STATE CASE -- SET THE MATTER FOR A 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. 
AND DO YOU HAVE WITH YOU, MR. GALLEGOS, YOUR CALENDAR? 
WHAT I'M THINKING IS, CAN WE SET THIS FOR A PRETRIAL 
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